maximizers of regime power in the financial sector. Second, despite exceptional growth in the years of the oil boom, banks were focused on rent-seeking and did not provide much credit to the productive sectors of the economy. While enabling for insiders, the patterns of governance and distributional outcomes created significant sector fragilities. Third, the initial domestic space for influencing sector design was reduced in the context of the post-2014 drop in oil prices, and that global regulatory pressures became a major influence in the sector's trajectory.
Beyond these empirical findings, we make three additional claims. First, building on work by Peter Lewis, Howard Stein and Catherine Boone, we pay special attention to the internal and political dimensions of Angola's reform trajectory. 7 We do not mean to underplay external factors, the importance of which we have discussed elsewhere, such as resource-rich Angola's position in the world economy 8 : the very choices afforded to decision-makers during the oil boom owed to a positive global conjuncture that has since been reversed. However, the remarkable degree of Angolan autonomy in shaping the banking sector is noteworthy in the period from 2002 to 2014. In addition to Angola's sui generis post-Cold War capitalism and post-civil war political settlement, the article underlines the importance of late colonial and early postcolonial legacies and the statist mindset of the ruling party for post-2002 banking development. The interests of powerful domestic groups, in a society where business and party elites are virtually coterminous, decisively shaped sector structures, policy and regulation during the period under scrutiny. External actors who have been influential elsewhere, such as the IMF, the World Bank and western donors, played a secondary role in defining the timing or initial character of reform in Angola, even if international regulatory pressures became more important in recent years.
Following from this, we argue that a country's resource endowment, and particularly the presence of large oil reserves, is key in accounting for the creation and evolution of different financial regimes. Oil money contributed to the development of Angolan banking, and the volatility of oil prices keeps it in flux; oil as source of revenue means other sectors are neglected. The importance of oil is clear in terms of the regime's initial aloofness from external pressures as well as autonomy from domestic social forces: without oil, Angola could never have afforded the financial sector trajectory studied here. Finally, the article underlines the importance of regime type for banking reform in terms of patterns of ownership, regulation, and distributional outcomes.
Despite its size and importance, the Angolan banking sector is underresearched. This article is therefore exploratory in character. It is based on the limited available data, 9 interviews with stakeholders and the authors' knowledge of Angola's political economy. The article's focuses on banking because the financial sector outside banking is underdeveloped. Though Angola had, on the eve of the 2014 oil price fall, a newly minted Sovereign Wealth Fund, there is still no stock exchange, capital markets are embryonic, and non-banking financial institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds play a peripheral role, with almost 100 percent of the country's financial assets held by banks. 10 Section one provides historical context on Angola and the development of its banks up to the end of the civil war in 2002. The purpose of section two is to analyze the rise of banking in the decade up to the oil price crisis in 2014. Paying particular attention to the role of the state as the handmaiden of banking expansion, the section studies the variety of banks that emerged, their partnerships with foreign banks, the character of operations, and relations with the oil sector. The third section discusses the limits of banking development during this decade, the major regulatory efforts, and the impact on banking of a 70 percent oil price collapse since 2014. The final section provides an explanation of Angola's banking expansion since 2002 and suggests a number of broader lessons for the study of the political economy of banking in contemporary Africa.
Angolan banking until 2002
A number of scholars of African banking claim that the prior character of state-society relations and institutional and regulatory configurations are crucial in understanding the outcome of financial sector reform in individual countries. 11 The choices of postcolonial leaders are important in accounting for outcomes. 12 In the case of Angola, these took the form of the early dismantling and nationalization of the late colonial financial system, followed in the 1990s by an elite-controlled post-Socialist reform 9. We are particularly appreciative of the work of the Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica at the Catholic University of Angola, whose annual reports are an invaluable source for the study of the Angolan economy. 10. IMF, 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Time for a policy reset' (World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, IMF, Washington, DC, 2016), p. 54. 11. Lewis and Stein, 'Shifting fortunes'. 12. Arriola, Multiethnic coalitions.
process that excluded the financial sector from privatization. 13 The subsequent expansion of banking welcomed both national and international private capital, but with state ownership (and overarching regime oversight) left intact. Despite their critique of colonial financial arrangements, Angolan leaders have also borrowed from the pre-1975 arrangements throughout different policy regimes over forty years. This longer history, with its unbroken emphasis on political control over banks, conditions contemporary banking development in myriad ways.
The role of metropolitan financial capital in the exploitation of Angola harks back to the mid-nineteenth century. The Banco Nacional Ultramarino, the sole bank in existence until 1926, favored the interests of the Lisbon bourgeoisie to the detriment of those of Angola's settler bourgeoisie.
14 Its successor, the Banco de Angola, remained both the issuer of currency and the only commercial bank for another three decades until metropolitan financial capital created non-financial enterprises in Angolan farming, services and industry in the 1950s. A significant economic boom in the 1960s and early 1970s (partly owing to policies that responded to the emergence of armed struggle against Portuguese rule) brought the commercial activities of five additional banks and four financial institutions to Angola. 15 These banks had a privileged relationship with a select group of financial-industrial conglomerates that were often owned by the same shareholders and dominated particular sectors of the economy. 16 Metropolitan capital again played the crucial role, while the white settlers as well as black Angolans were marginal in this process. Foreign banks did not operate in late colonial Angola but held shares in Portuguese banks and Angola's largest firms.
17
At independence in 1975, the fairly well developed banking system consisted of the Banco de Angola (simultaneously a central bank, currency issuer and commercial bank), other commercial banks and non-banking financial institutions. 18 Although the early postcolonial period saw radical changes, three legacies of the late colonial period would prove influential THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BANKING IN ANGOLA for financial liberalization in the 1990s. The first is the importance of a robust banking sector for late colonial economic success and an understanding that its redevelopment after the Socialist period (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) was essential. The second is the perceived need to associate the banking sector with local business groups, and the synergies that could result from that. Thirdly, that foreign capital can be present in Angolan banking, provided it is tamed by the state and by regime interests.
The advent of independence under the Socialist rule of the MPLA was transformative, 19 owing to the movement's policy of 'revolutionary suppression of private property of the means of production'. 20 The confiscation of settler property, including in the financial sector, started in March 1976 and did not end until 1990. 21 In order to be 'real and profound', President dos Santos argued, the transformation 'needed to [impact] on the economic and financial interests of the Portuguese colonialists'.
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(Ironically, the reopening of the financial system in the 1990s drew in Portuguese investors first and foremost.) The Banco de Angola and the private banks were nationalized. The Banco de Angola became the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA), 23 the country's central bank, currency issuer, treasury, and commercial bank. The Banco Comercial de Angola became the Banco Popular, meant to deal with individual savings. All bank deposits were transferred to state banks. In 1978, private banks were closed, with the BNA taking over banking branches, and insurance activities were moved to ENSA (Empresa Nacional de Seguros e Resseguros de Angola), the new state insurer. The remaining private insurers were closed in 1981.
The 1976 Nationalizations and Expropriation Law and the MarxistLeninist 1978 Constitution sought to create a new financial system. As stated in the MPLA First Congress, 'all vestiges of the colonial financial system and of the mechanisms of a society ruled by the capitalist mode of production must quickly [disappear] , giving way to a new financial system whose characteristics match the demands of central planning of the national economy and the construction of socialism ' . 24 elite, who mostly came from the public sector and had little private sector experience. The settler exodus also guaranteed that no autonomous business class would counter this statist agenda. More important, the new MPLA rulers understood the need to control access to capital as a precondition for their tenuous grip over the war-torn country.
The political rationality of this agenda notwithstanding, the economic inefficiencies of the statist approach to finance were soon evident, and made worse by the return of UNITA's South African-backed insurgency from the late 1970s. At the First Extraordinary Party Congress in 1980, proposals emerged regarding the reformulation of the financial sector, the possibility of 'autonomous' management of 'the BNA's central banking and commercial-banking roles' and the creation of a foreign trade bank.
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By 1985, the economy had declined to such an extent that the MPLA Second Congress dealt at length with the problems of the financial sector. 26 Yet the first attempt at reform came only with the 1987 Programa de Saneamento Económico e Financeiro (SEF). 27 In 1991, the BNA announced the creation of three state-owned comercial and investment banks, Banco de Poupança e Crédito (BPC), Banco do Comércio e Indústria (BCI) and Caixa Agrícola e de Pescas (CAP). These new banks would guarantee continuing state control over credit. The BNA also mentioned the possibility of allowing shareholders 'that aren't just state companies', i.e., private shareholders.
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Held in 1990 at the tail end of the Cold War, and in the face of sweeping changes in southern Africa, the MPLA's Third Congress confronted the failure of the Socialist model. The MPLA made an equivocal commitment to financial sector reform, seeing the 'the existence of a functional [domestic] financial system' as a prerequisite for Angola's articulation with the global economy, 29 but the goal was to keep banks and credit allocation under strict control. The conundrum was how to involve the state with the private sector, and Angolan shareholders with foreign shareholders, without loss of MPLA preeminence. 30 This degree of initial uncertainty meant that the state-supported creation of an Angolan business class through privatization would not include banking, which was The emergence of Angola's private banks was therefore protracted and piecemeal. As late as 1993, the BNA was responsible for 84 percent of credit to enterprises and householders, a role it kept until it ended its commercial activity in 1996. 33 Amidst currency devaluations, a currency replacement, three-digit-high inflation and the war against UNITA, the MPLA preferred to keep a grip over credit allocation. The three public banks were never privatized, despite repeated commitments to do so. 34 MPLA loyalists held shares in the new private banks, but the banks were also heavily participated by the state, state-owned enterprises such as the national oil company, Sonangol, and even (in the case of BAI in 1997, BCA in 1999 and Banco Sol in 2001) direct MPLA participation through its GEFI business conglomerate. 35 This pattern of state, SOE and party participation in the development of private commercial banks is a distinctive characteristic of Angola's banking sector.
A focus on the problems and underperformance of the financial sector elides the key role played by the national oil company, Sonangol, in managing the real finances of the state. A relatively well managed, if unorthodox, corporation that was Africa's second largest by 2013, Sonangol acted as the regime's lifeline to the world economy. 36 Its creditworthiness was higher than that of the state and was placed at the service of contracting loans from international banks, many of them oil-backed and run through opaque special purpose vehicles. In a highly unusual financial role for an SOE, Sonangol routinely realized quasi-fiscal operations that, according to the IMF, amounted to half of the government's revenues by the late 1990s. 37 It is unsurprising that the first 'private' Angolan bank, BAI, was established in 1997 with Sonangol as the largest shareholder. In short, though its formal financial system was a shambles, the regime's running of the war economy through Sonangol's parallel state was capable and contributed towards victory in the civil war in 2002. While lucrative for regime insiders, the political economy of war was changing even in the last years of the conflict. The chaos of the 1990s had been instrumental for elite accumulation through strategies ranging from privatization and exchange rate scams to war profiteering. 38 However, those unstable conditions now stood in the way of new opportunities. Dos Santos pushed for economic stabilization and a 'renewal of the management style' that imposed the 'minimal conditions, not for the country's development, but for the functioning of a renewed (even if fundamentally rentier) capitalism'. 39 This reformist turn, while welcomed by foreign investors and the World Bank and IMF, was internally generated. At this stage, the presence of the World Bank was peripheral and the relationship with the IMF acrimonious. Though devastated by the war, oil-rich Angola was not dependent on western donors. 40 The key incentive for this reform drive was to enable the benefits of the oil-fuelled peace economy to flow to favoured constituencies through both the distribution of available rents and the creation of new rents. While officially designed to buttress a national 'private' sector, the strategy was state-led. The resulting banking sector is a hybrid that is neither public nor private, and is best conceived of as 'state-, party-and elite-owned', 41 in which public efforts create the conditions for elite private accumulation.
Angolan banking since 2002
At the turn of the century, Angola's banking sector could still be described as the 'ideal-type case of a statist regime'. 42 As the IMF noted in 2001, 'management problems in the state-owned banks have generated large shares of non-performing loans and recurrent recapitalizations'. 47 This paragraph is merely indicative of the extent of elite bank ownership, in a distributive process closely controlled by former President dos Santos. 48 The list of politically exposed persons (current and former high officials of the ruling party, senior civil servants, 44 . SOEs with bank stakes include ENSA (the leading insurance company), TAAG (the national airline), the armed forces pension fund, Angola Telecom, Endiama (the state diamond company), SONIP (a Sonangol subsidiary), and the National Institute of Social Security (INSS). generals, and their families) with bank shareholdings would be too lengthy for this article. 49 The trend towards greater Angolan control of the sector is clearly shown in Table 1 . Foreign capital, which was dominant in 2005, with almost half of total assets, falls significantly in the subsequent decade, with Angolan private capital moving from the bottom to a dominant position during the same period.
Angolan banking shows a high degree of concentration, with 68.5 percent of assets held by the top five banks in 2015, 50 and an estimated 91 percent held by the top ten banks, while the remaining, mostly locally owned, banks are small and weakly capitalized. Although the share of deposits held by the top five banks has diminished from 88.8 percent to 65.3 percent (and of credit from 89.8 percent to 74.3 percent, see Table 2 ) from 2005 to 2015, the top banks showed a noteworthy resilience to the emergence of 16 new banks during this period.
Underpinned by the liquidity provided by the oil boom, banking saw extraordinary levels of profitability, especially in the early years (see Table 3 ). The initial levels of profitability were not sustainable with the entry of new banks and the impact of the economic downturn from 2014 onwards: while sector-wide return on investment took two and half years in 2005, it was six and half years in 2015. However, it is noteworthy that there are banks that present a return on average equity (ROAE) near or even above 50 percent. Similarly, the return on average assets (ROAA) is high, though it has fallen by half between 2005 and 2015. Moreover, smaller banks also ranked in the top five of profitability (ROAE), denoting how easy it was to perform well in such a financial market.
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Despite the increase in the number of banking institutions, operations remain relatively basic, with high charges and a restricted number of services. According to the industry publication The Banker, Angolan banks made 'the bulk of their earnings from government bonds rather than growing their loan books' and had a marked preference for short-term operations such as currency trading or trade finance. lending, even short term) is given out to the elite. As a senior BNA figure remarked in 2009, 'about 85 percent of Angolan credit goes to two hundred or so clients'.
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These obstacles notwithstanding, the number of bank branches, 55 ATMs, point of sale terminals, credit card use, online banking, and percentage of bankable population grew throughout the decade, if overwhelmingly concentrated in the province of Luanda. 56 Bank deposits increased from 21 percent of GDP in 2005 to 49 percent in 2013 (reflecting the increasingly large distribution network), considerably above the sub-Saharan African average of 30 percent of GDP. 57 After 2011, the oil price rise above $100 led to a reduction of treasuries yields, which became a major incentive to expand loan books. However, the results of this were still limited by the time the crisis started in 2014.
In line with their overarching role in Angola's post-war reconstruction, external partners were important in the expansion of banking. Of the 29 registered Angolan banks in July 2015, nine were partnerships with Portuguese banks and one was a joint venture with Standard Bank of Contrary to most African banking systems, bank growth in Angola is not directly dependent on foreign financial capital flows, as their capital is generated by Angola's oil revenues. Instead, foreign partners are needed for their sectoral expertise and have been responsible for the adoption of modern financial tools, the bearers of some policy ideas, and the general shaping (at least in superficial terms) of Angolan banking in the image of international banking. Foreign partners are also important on account of their (and their home jurisdictions') international credibility and legitimacy, a major asset in helping to offset Angola's money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism records. At the same time, these partnerships are formally (through Angolan majority ownership) or informally (a bank's dependence on the Angolan market) calibrated in ways that guarantee Luanda's control. Indeed, a recurrent pattern sees foreign banks enter Angola only to be pressured into selling stakes to Angolan private interests, as was the case with Standard Bank and the major Portuguese banks. 59 The result is that between 2005 and 2015 the percentage of total banking assets in Angolan private ownership moved from 28 percent to 49.3 percent. 60 Some scholars argue that foreign banks can be the drivers of change through the promotion of international best practice. In Angola, however, foreign-participated banks respond to the same context and incentive structures as Angolan banks and behave similarly. 62 Foreign banks thus show little concern with financial intermediation. They do not lend to small and medium enterprises or productive sectors and are able to conceive of profit in Angola without broader financial development. Focusing instead on corporate banking, they primarily deal with their own foreign clients present in Angola as well as with the state and SOEs. In the decade up to 2014, foreign banking partners were deferential in terms of the shape of Angola's financial sector and acted as willing instruments of the oligarchs' pursuit of internationalization and the laundering of their monies.
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Limits to Angolan financial development A profitable first decade notwithstanding, the impact of Angolan banks has been disappointing in terms of wider financial development, whether we measure this in terms of broad-based lending or a contribution towards diversification of the economy away from oil. The first limitation pertains to the weak linkages to productive sectors and banks' limited contribution to economic diversification or financial inclusion and deepening. They do not provide much credit to agriculture or industry. Data from 2010, 2011 and 2012 shows that these sectors jointly attracted 14.6 percent, 11.1 percent and 13.8 percent of credit in each of these years, and were dwarfed by real estate, construction, trade and services (see Table 4 ). 64 Instead of lending significantly to the real economy, Angolan 
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The same applies to its reluctance to lend to small and medium enterprises. African banks generally lend less to the private sector than banks in non-African developing countries, 66 but Angolan banks even less so, despite the official commitment towards it. 67 Some of this is explained by the rudimentary nature of Angolan firms: many have nothing like conventional accounting, and securing collateral is almost impossible with a highly dysfunctional judicial system. State-owned banks officially hold two-thirds of non-performing loans, 68 which suggests that private banks are risk-averse in their lending decisions. Yet the manner in which BESA (see below) gave loans to the elite shows not only that non-performing loans by private banks may be underestimated but that their reluctance to lend beyond a tight sphere of insiders is at least partly linked to a reluctance to provide credit to wider constituencies. There is nothing unique to the Angolan elite's lack of support for accumulation beyond the ruling coalition, as 'independent capitalists may become political rivals and […] pose a serious threat'. 69 This could still have a productive impact if elite beneficiaries redeploy 'resources from primitive accumulation' and channel them 'into production and firms that undertake learning and the 70 but this is not the case in Angola. In sum, the banking sector has acted neither as a promoter of entrepreneurship nor as a catalyst for diversification away from oil.
The second dimension that has held back banking is the lax character of sector regulation. 71 The financial crisis of 2008 had a drastic, if relatively short-lived, impact on the Angolan economy, with oil prices collapsing from $147 in August 2008 to $40 later in the year. This fiscal shock resulted in the quick erosion of the BNA's reserves based on a policy of defending Angola's currency, the Kwanza. Simultaneously, persistent claims that senior BNA personnel had stolen considerable amounts of money further deteriorated the credibility of the BNA leadership, 72 and led to their replacement in April 2009 by a new team with a reformist mandate. 73 Although discussions at the presidency with a view to improving regulation were said to have occurred as early as 2007, 74 there is no doubt that the crisis gave impetus to this reformist drive, which would remain in place in subsequent years.
Differently from the internally managed trajectory since the early 2000s, the post-2009 banking reforms received some external support. A 2012 IMF-World Bank Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) identified the fragilities of Angolan banking. 75 The IMF standby arrangement from March 2009 to March 2012 also put some emphasis on the need for regulatory reform. This provided decision-makers with some reform strategies, although a prominent Angolan official remarked that the FSSA was 'a [diagnostic], not a roadmap for reform'. 76 But the key reform driver was the political mandate provided by the president to the new team: the IMF's reform agenda was momentarily aligned with the regime's goals, rather than setting the agenda in its own right. Although external pressure increased post-2009 and would steadily build up, AFRICAN AFFAIRS internal regime priorities continued to define the character of reform and to place limits to what could be reformed.
Starting in 2010, under the leadership of new governor José de Lima Massano and Vice-Governor Ricardo Viegas de Abreu, the BNA experienced significant restructuring designed to promote 'convergence with international practice'. 77 Reforms included the establishment of a new department to manage liquidity, exchange rate and operation risk in the banking sector; the creation of a benchmark interest rate, the level of which was to be decided by a new Monetary Policy Committee every month 78 ; the creation of the Interbank offering rate (Luibor); new committees on the management of reserves and financial stability; efforts towards convergence on prudential supervision including aspects of Basel 2 and 3, 79 and on the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards; and an increase in bank capital requirements from $6 to $25 million. 80 In order to lower the dollarization of the economy, a Foreign Exchange Law was passed in 2012 mandating that all oil sector operations need to run through Angolan banks, which has expanded flows into the Angolan banking system by about $20-30 billion. 81 After its blacklisting by the OECD's Financial Action Task Force as one of five countries that posed a threat to the international financial system, Angola pursued reforms that brought it back from the brink. 82 However, the outcome of this flurry of reformist measures and enlightened legislation was less than the sum of the parts. 'The challenge has been implementation', noted an Angolan senior official in 2016. 83 Some officials pointed to human resource constraints at the BNA and the banks as partly accounting for this lag, but implementation was also constrained by lack of political will. From 2010 regulators could, and to a certain extent were encouraged to, improve sector governance, especially in The politicized and circumscribed character of the BNA's reform mandate was evident in the way it dealt with the 2014 fall of BESA. As the lower oil prices had yet to sink in, Angola was hit by the near-collapse of its second largest bank and leading lender. After revelations in April 2014 that BESA held $5.7 billion dollars in bad loans, many of whose (elite) holders could not be identified or pursued, President dos Santos gave the bank a sovereign guarantee and arranged for a BNA rescue. 84 Following on the heels of the collapse of its Portuguese parent bank, the Espírito Santo Bank, this underlined the mutual dependency of both banking sectors. 85 BESA shareholders had included members of the elite such as Isabel dos Santos through the GENI group. 86 The BNA's swift involvement showed that the state would intervene to defend their interests. Further to this, Sonangol became the biggest shareholder in the rescued bank (renamed Banco Económico), highlighting yet again the company's pervasive role in the financial sector and the symbiotic relationship between oligarchic and SOE participations. 87 The BNA leadership expressed concerns about bad loans in other banks and asked for audits of the asset quality of 14 banks to prevent further damage, but 'its hands were tied by the political contours of the case' and the president's direct involvement in protecting elite interests.
88
The narrow range of banking activities and the character of regulation meant that sector growth had not resulted in broader financial development. But the impact of the decline in oil prices from $112 in June 2014 to $28 in early 2016 halted the progress of Angolan banks. By late 2014, the financial system was hit by dollar scarcity. Soon capital controls were introduced, making it very difficult to take dollars out of Angola, with the BNA responsible for rationing access to hard currency. While designed to ensure 'the import of essential foodstuffs, healthcare supplies and manufacturing equipment', 89 the politicized manner in which the BNA gave access to dollars as well as the reappearance of a vibrant parallel currency market resulted in widespread dissatisfaction. In addition, the withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships (partnerships with external financial institutions for the purposes of foreign transactions) as a solution to 'de-risking' continued apace. 90 In November 2015, Bank of America, Rand Merchant Bank and other banks stopped providing Angolan banks with US dollars; by December, all but one foreign bank had stopped supplying dollars to Angolan client banks. 91 Attempts to leverage China and other Asian financial centers to counter US pressures did not go far. 92 On top of these problems, a major decision by the European Central Bank cast a harsh light over the credibility of the Angolan financial system. Considering it a poorly regulated jurisdiction, the European Central Bank ordered BPI, a leading Portuguese bank and shareholder of Angola's BFA, to diminish its exposure by selling off its Angolan assets.
In the early 2000s, the regime had been able to pursue its own course, using external partners to help mold the new banking sector yet maintaining control of the direction of reform. This autonomous space has shrunk considerably in recent years, and banking reform now occurs in a more constraining international context. Some global regulatory pressures, despite Luanda's protestations, are systemic, rather than targeted at Angola. Others are indeed related to the accumulation of international criticism, particularly over the presence of Political Exposed Persons as shareholders of Angolan banks. The upshot is that Angolan banks are now in the spotlight like never before.
By 2016, therefore, the banking sector was in flux. The crisis showed its deep vulnerability to oil price shifts: banks suffered from the economic slowdown and the scarcity of foreign currency, particularly on account of the centrality of bank income raised from foreign exchange intermediation and trade finance commissions. 93 The IMF was still noting: 'Angolan banks have relatively solid underlying fundamentals on aggregate', but warned that the balance sheets of some banks had deteriorated in recent years. 94 The creation of RECREDIT, a public company to manage banking system debt, was seen as a positive step. Optimistic voices hoped that the crisis might be the catalyzer of change in terms of both consolidation (through mergers and the concomitant disappearance of the smaller, undercapitalized banks, or the entry of new shareholders) and increased credit for economic diversification. In 2015, BPA and Millennium Angola merged and in 2017 Grupo Mais took over the Banco Pungo Andongo, but at the time of writing there were no further instances of consolidation. Regarding the provision of credit to the wider economy, the crisis resulted in a further contraction. This was the case of the June 2015 announcement by BPC, the largest public bank and at that stage the leading provider of credit, that it would stop providing credit. 95 Both BPC and BCI, the other major public bank, have been restructured since. As an Angolan banker put it, 'banks and the sector regulator have not dealt badly with the downturn: thus far a major systemic crisis has been averted. But the key goal is sector survival, not reinvention […] banks are actually retrenching when it comes to lending'. 96 
Making sense of Angolan banking
While acknowledging the important role of external drivers for the trajectory of the banking sector, especially the oil boom that ended in 2014, this article focuses primarily on the political and internal dimensions of sector reform with emphasis on the timing of reform and sector design. The Angolan case shows a process of banking growth that was initiated at a time, and under terms, defined by the MPLA regime following its war victory in 2002. In addition to the oil money, a hegemonic peace and strong degree of elite cohesiveness jointly enabled this path. A degree of initial discretionary power at the level of the presidency gave further strategic impetus to banking reform. We argue that this can only be understood by reference to 'pre-existing patterns of state regulation of the economy and by already established patterns of state-society interaction'. 97 The nature of the Luanda regime is central in accounting for patterns of ownership, regulation, and distributional outcomes.
The centrality of the regime agenda for understanding the trajectory of banking is made evident in the MPLA's strategic goal of creating a socalled national bourgeoisie. 98 This relatively coherent agenda was outlined in party documents and presidential speeches: in the postwar era, Angola needed 'strong families and business groups' that held significant capital. 99 Such a bourgeoisie had not been allowed to emerge under settler colonialism, but now the party-state would be its handmaiden through the judicious distribution of assets, money, and profit-making opportunities. Implicit in this commitment was the MPLA's control of the process of class formation: benefits would accrue to the politically connected, through narrow channels, rather than bestowed upon society. Although this allocation agenda may have favored hundreds of thousands of middle class urbanites close to the party during the boom years, it disproportionately benefitted a handful of oligarchic MPLA families. The modern banking sector, with its dual focus on rent sharing and the generation of new rents, was central to this process, its tightly connected shareholders exclusively drawn from the summit of the regime. In this context, the usual dichotomy between the private and the public is meaningless. Angola does not possess a sizeable business class that is analytically distinguishable from the political elite: they are mostly the same individuals. The connection of this apparatchik class with the party-state is what defined 'the politics, timing and extent of banking sector liberalization'. 100 The elusive line between the public and the private was further illustrated by the regime's goal of remaining in control of banks through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. State banks were not privatized; many new banks have Angolan SOEs or the ruling party as key shareholders; and their 'private' investors are party barons or fronts for regime interests. 101 These diverse strategies jointly advance the imperative of remaining in control of the commanding heights of the economy in a manner consistent with the mindset of the postcolonial party-state and with the colonial history of regime-controlled banking.
In addition to regime type, Angola's resource endowment is key in explaining both the character and the timing of this process. Especially during 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 , it generated the vast amounts of capital that would underpin the new banks (obviating the need for foreign capital, which is at the root of many banking sectors in resource-poor African states) and the regime's aloofness from external conditionality. It also gave the Angolan economy a further source of volatility, with oil booms and busts linked to credit booms and busts. As the post-2014 crisis shows, Angolan banks are not shock absorbers, but rather part of the amplification effect of oil on the domestic economy. Before, the major risk was the oil price; now the very size of the banking sector, without adequate regulation, is a 'systemic concern'. 102 The Angolan banking sector faces a major challenge: even if the oil price rebounds, the 2004-2014 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BANKING IN ANGOLA AFRICAN AFFAIRS was not the failure portrayed by the World Bank and IMF, though it did have unintended consequences that undermined Angola's economy in the medium run. It was rather a deliberate strategy. Banks and their elite shareholders discouraged independent forms of accumulation and laboured hard to prevent non-insiders (politically unconnected businessmen, the opposition) from accessing credit or becoming shareholders.
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There was a deep reluctance to put in place secondary debt markets. This narrowness was in turn connected with the skepticism of banks regarding the potential of Angola's economy outside restricted sectors. Banks did not believe in the likelihood of diversification away from oil or the vibrancy of small and medium enterprises and had no incentive to take risks in this regard. Short of systemic change, they will remain narrow generators and allocators of rents as well as enablers of capital flight.
An emphasis on the domestic politics of banking, the character of the regime, and structural legacies informing sector development goes hand in hand with the strong agential action by Angolan decision-makers during much of the last decade, although this has diminished considerably since the advent of the oil price drop in 2014. Partial reform designed to strengthen elite interests adds specificity to the character of Angola's financial repression, but does not transcend it. As Lewis and Stein noted in the Nigerian case, sector outcomes during the boom years were not so much a matter of policy but of structural intent: broad-based financial sector development needs an elite that is really seeking development through domestic investment. 111 We have to look beyond specific policies (sector-enabling or not) and into the broader political economy that determines the evolution of banking. Under the political conditions described in this article, an open and competitive banking system in Angola, or other tightly controlled regimes, is a highly unlikely outcome. 
